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court concluded the statute applied only to the need for the facility
itself, but did not apply to the methods of providing particular public
services.
Additionally, the court rejected the Association's argument that, in
considering an application for a utility facility in an EFU zone, a local
government must compare alternative EFU-zoned sites and choose the
site that is "least disruptive" to agriculture. The court stated neither
the statute nor case law imposes such a requirement on local
governments.
Therefore, the court held LUBA did not err in
affirming the portions of the County's decision related to the intake
wells and related facilities.
Note: Through Oregon Laws 1999, chapter 816, section 3, the
legislature enacted an extensive provision relating to the general
subject of utility facilities in agricultural zones. See OR. REV. STAT. §
215.275. The application in this case was filed before that statute took
effect.
Kathryn S. Kanda
UTAH
Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 9 P.3d 762 (Utah 2000) (mandating
strict compliance with statute's public notice requirements where a
water right holder's change application had been extended over
fourteen years).
Leucadia Financial Corporation ("Leucadia") and Michael Longley
("Longley") held water rights in the Atkinville area, south of the Virgin
River. Longley's rights were junior to Leucadia's rights. In 1970, the
State Engineer granted Leucadia's change application. Over the next
fifteen years, Leucadia received four extensions to effectuate its
change. In the fourth extension, the State Engineer cautioned
Leucadia that no further extensions would be granted and required
proof of appropriation by November 30, 1989. In November 1989,
Longley requested notice of any action on Leucadia's application from
the State Engineer.
On November 30, 1989, Leucadia filed an unsigned and factually
incorrect proof of permanent change. In September 1990, Leucadia
simultaneously requested a withdrawal of its false proof, a
reinstatement of its original change application, and a fifth extension.
The State Engineer's Memorandum Decision rejected the proof of
permanent change and declared the change application lapsed.
Upon Leucadia's request for reconsideration, the State Engineer
rescinded the Memorandum Decision, reinstated Leucadia's change
application, and ordered the fifth extension request reprocessed.
After Leucadia refiled its fifth extension request, the State Engineer
published notice of the fifth extension with a deadline for filing a
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protest. Longley filed his protest a year after the deadline passed. The
State Engineer granted Leucadia's fifth extension. The State Engineer
disregarded Longley's protest and his request for reconsideration.
Longley sought judicial review of Leucadia's fifth extension. The
district court found Longley lacked standing to appeal the State
Engineer's decision due to his failure to protest before the deadline
passed. The court of appeals affirmed, stating the insufficient notice
given by the State Engineer did not void the fifth extension.
The Supreme Court of Utah considered Longley's argument that,
under Utah's statutory procedure governing water rights, the court of
appeals should have reversed the district court's decision. To do so,
the court reviewed the court of appeals' construction of applicable
statutes, and not the decision of the trial court. The court determined
the relevant statute was the provision mandating public notice where
change application extensions exceed fourteen years. The notice must
include a description of the diligence claimed and the reason for the
extension request.
The court looked to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation
.to determine whether the State Engineer's notice met the statutory
requirements. The purpose of the water rights statutes reflects the
public policy to assure water is put to a beneficial use and to promote
equitable distribution and efficient use of water. To further this
purpose, the legislature included the public in change application
extensions greater than fourteen years and gave individuals with rights
in the same water supply the ability to protest.
The court then looked to other cases strictly interpreting public
notice statutes. The court found parties must strictly comply with
public notice procedures to avoid defeating the purpose of the
statutes, and applied this reasoning to water rights cases. Public notice
fulfills the purpose of the water rights statutory scheme. Notice of an
applicant's plans for the beneficial use of water or the causes of delay
in the application provides the public with a role in establishing
equitable and efficient water use.
The court concluded the State Engineer's published notice lacked
both the diligence claimed by Leucadia and the reasons for its
extension request.
The court noted Leucadia held a change
application for more than twenty years without effectuating the
proposed changes and engaged in questionable practices during the
application and extension process. These factors necessitated public
notice and input.
The State Engineer's failure to strictly comply with the public
notice requirement rendered the notice void. Since the notice was
void, the deadline to protest was not triggered. Longley's protest was
valid, the State Engineer's refusal to hear Longley's protest was
unwarranted, and Longley had standing before the district court. The
court reversed and remanded to the district court.
Sara Wagers

